This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
Introduction
Upper semicontinuity, quasisupermodularity, and Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) single crossing are su¢ cient for a normal-form game where the strategy sets are compact lattices in Euclidean spaces to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 3 In many economics-related games, the strategy sets are totally ordered. If this is the case, both upper semicontinuity and single crossing are excessively demanding. The focus of this paper is on relaxing both of the two conditions.
In games with strategic complementarities, the best-reply correspondences are usually assumed to be nonempty-valued and subcomplete-sublattice-valued. These propitious properties of the best-reply correspondences are achieved by making a not entirely innocuous assumption, namely that each player's payo¤ function is upper semicontinuous in her own strategy, which noticeably narrows the class of games covered by the lattice-theoretic approach. In this paper, upper semicontinuity is replaced with the following couples of conditions: either with Tian and Zhou's (1995) transfer weak upper continuity and directional upper semicontinuity or with Reny's (1999) better-reply security and directional upper semicontinuity.
For games where the payo¤ functions are transfer weakly upper continuous in own strategies, single crossing is generalized to directional transfer single crossing. The word 'directional' means that single crossing is divided into upward single crossing and downward single crossing, and the word 'transfer' re ‡ects the fact that, in this paper, the notion of an increasing correspondences is understood in Smithson's (1971) and Fujimoto's (1984) sense. We illustrate the interplay of di¤erent notions in games with strategic complementarities with the aid of a partnership game (Example 4).
A number of waiting and timing games can be covered within the proposed framework. In the war of attrition game studied in Example 5, player 1's payo¤ function satis…es upward single crossing and player 2's payo¤ function satis…es downward single crossing when the natural order relation on player 2's strategy set is reversed.
The lattice-theoretic approach covers a large number of oligopoly models (see, e.g., Roberts and Sonnenschein, 1976; Vives, 1990; Amir, 1996; Vives, 1999; and Amir and De Castro, 2015) . However, the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogeneous products is not one of them since its payo¤ functions are too discontinuous. At the same time, in the two-…rm case, for example, if, initially, the pro…t-maximizing …rms charge prices exceeding the unit cost of production, then any of them has no incentive to lower its price in reaction to an increase in the price charged by its rival. On the other hand, If the demand curve has a conventional convex shape, the quasiconcavity of the Bertrand duopoly game tends to fail, and, consequently, it might be impossible to apply Reny's (1999) equilibrium existence theorem and any of its generalizations. 4 We handle the equilibrium existence problem in games where the best-reply correspondences are not necessarily nonempty-valued everywhere in two steps. The …rst step employs lattice-theoretic tools and directional upper semicontinuity to investigate the existence of "-equilibria, and the second step relies on the fact that, in better-reply secure games, limits of sequences of "-Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria. In order to express strategic complementarities in terms of "-best-reply correspondences, two more directional modi…cations of single crossing are introduced. The proposed equilibrium existence conditions are applied to a nonquasiconcave Bertrand duopoly model with homogeneous products (Example 6).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains some theoretical underpinnings necessary for studying strategic complementarities in discontinuous games. The main results of the paper are presented in Section 3, and the illustrating examples are provided in Section 4.
Preliminaries
This section provides some lattice-theoretic and topological de…nitions and auxiliary results.
Posets
Given a nonempty set P , a binary relation on P is a partial order if it is re ‡exive, antisymmetric, and transitive. The pair (P; ) is a partially ordered set or poset, though it is often said that P is a poset if there is no ambiguity regarding the order relation involved. A poset P is totally ordered if every x; y 2 P are comparable, that is, x y or y x. A nonempty subset S is a chain in P if S is totally ordered by . The interval topology on a totally ordered set P is the topology generated by the closed subbase consisting of the sets [a; +1) = fp 2 P : a pg and ( 1; a] = fp 2 P : p ag where a 2 P . Every totally ordered set in its interval topology is a normal Hausdor¤ space (see, e.g., Birkho¤, 1967, p. 241) . Denote the asymmetric part of the relation by .
Let (P; ) be a poset. An element m 2 P is a maximal element (resp., a minimal element) of P if for all p 2 P , m p (resp., p m) implies m = p. An element m 2 P is the greatest element (resp., the least element) of P if p m (resp., m p) for all p 2 P . Let S P . An upper (resp., lower) bound for S is an element p 2 P such that s p (resp., p s) for all s 2 S. The least upper bound (resp., the greatest lower bound) of S is also called the join (resp., the meet) of S and is denoted by _S (resp.,^S). The set P is a lattice if every pair of elements of P has a meet and a join. It is a complete lattice if P has arbitrary meets and arbitrary joins. If a subset S of P contains the join and meet of each pair of elements of S, then S is a sublattice of P . If, moreover, the meet and join of each nonempty subset of S exist and are contained in S, then S is a subcomplete sublattice of P . Consider, for example, the real line R with the usual order relation on it. Since its interval topology and the Euclidean topology of R coincide and a chain's compactness in the interval topology is equivalent to its completeness (see, e.g., Birkho¤, 1967, p. 241-242) , every compact subset of R under the Euclidean topology of R is a subcomplete sublattice of R. This fact also holds in the Euclidean spaces of higher dimensions (see, e.g., Topkis, 1998, Theorem 2.3.1) .
By a partially ordered metric space we mean a metric space P = (P; d) equipped with a partial order such that the intervals [a; +1) and ( 1; a] are closed for each a 2 P ; that is, the topology de…ned by the metric is …ner than the interval topology on P .
Lemma 1 Every totally ordered compact metric space is a complete chain.
In order to understand why Lemma 1 holds, it su¢ ces to notice that the completeness of a chain is equivalent to its compactness in the interval topology, and the latter follows from the compactness of the totally ordered metric space.
Upper semicontinuity
This subsection provides some basic facts about upper semicontinuous functions. First, we introduce two types of directional upper semicontinuity.
De…nition 1 Let P be a totally ordered compact metric space. A function f : P ! R is upward (resp., downward) order upper semicontinuous if for every increasing (resp., decreasing) sequence fp k g of elements of P ,
. A function f : P ! R is order upper semicontinuous if it is upward and downward order upper semicontinuous.
The de…nition of a real-valued, order upper semicontinuous function de…ned on a complete lattice can be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) .
Each of the directional upper semicontinuity properties is considerably weaker than the conventional upper semicontinuity property. Now let us look at some generalizations of upper semicontinuity from a topological point of view. Let P be a metric space, and let B(p; ) denote the open ball in P with center p 2 P and radius > 0. A function f : P ! R is upper semicontinuous at p if for any 2 R such that f (p) < , there exists > 0 such that f (s) < for all s 2 B(p; ). A function f : P ! R is upper semicontinuous if it is upper semicontinuous at every p 2 P . Another equivalent de…nition of upper semicontinuity is the following: A function f : P ! R is upper semicontinuous at p 2 P if and only if p k ! p in P implies that lim sup k f (p k ) f (p). This de…nition is made use of to show the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let P be a totally ordered compact metric space. A function f : P ! R is upper semicontinuous if and only if it is order upper semicontinuous.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in the Appendix for the sake of the reader's convenience.
The notion of an upper semicontinuous function was relaxed by Campbell and Walker (1990) and Tian and Zhou (1995) . Let P be a metric space. A function f : P ! R is upper continuous if for any points p, s 2 P , f (p) < f (s) implies that there exists > 0 such that f (r) < f (s) for all r 2 B(p; ). It is one more equivalent de…nition of an upper semicontinuous function. Replacing the latter inequality in the de…nition of an upper continuous function with its weak counterpart leads to a generalization of the notion of an upper semicontinuous function. A function f : P ! R is weakly upper continuous if for any points p, s 2 P , f (p) < f (s) implies that there exists > 0 such that f (r) f (s) for all r 2 B(p; ) (see Campbell and Walker, 1990) . The set of maximum points of a weakly upper continuous function on a compact set is nonempty but not necessarily closed. An important generalization of the notion of a weakly upper continuous function is that of a transfer weakly upper continuous function, due to Tian and Zhou (1995) . A function f : P ! R is transfer weakly upper continuous if for any points p, s 2 P , f (p) < f (s) implies that there exist u 2 P and > 0 such that f (r) f (u) for all r 2 B(p; ). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for a function de…ned on a compact subset of P to attain its maximum on the set is the transfer weak upper continuity of the function (see Tian and Zhou, 1995 , Theorem 1).
Increasing correspondences
Let P and T be posets. A function f : P ! T is increasing if p s in P implies f (p) f (s) in T . Since, according to Tarski's …xed point theorem (Tarski, 1955) , every increasing function from a complete lattice to itself has a …xed point, the problem of existence of a …xed point for an increasing correspondence is often reduced to showing that it has a single-valued increasing selection. However, depending on needs, several de…nitions of an increasing correspondence can be employed.
De…nition 2 Let P and T be posets. A nonempty-valued correspondence F : P T is increasing upward (resp., downward) if p s in P and u 2 F (p) (resp., v 2 F (s)) imply that there exists v 2 F (s) (resp., u 2 F (p)) such that u v. If a correspondence F : P T is increasing upward and downward, it is called increasing.
Smithson (1971) and Fujimoto (1984) extended Tarski's …xed point theorem to increasing correspondences (see, for more up-to-date results, Heikkila and Re¤ett, 2006; Carl and Heikkila, 2011) .
In the economics literature, a stronger notion of an increasing correspondence is more popular than the one given above.
T is Veinottincreasing upward and downward, it is called Veinott-increasing.
Another, more traditional name for a Veinott-increasing correspondence is a correspondence increasing in the induced (strong) set order (see, e.g., Topkis, 1998, p. 32) . It is easy to see that: (1) the notion of an increasing correspondence is considerably less demanding than the notion of a Veinott-increasing correspondence; and (2) an increasing correspondence need not have an increasing single-valued selection.
Example 2 Consider the correspondence
]nfpg. The set [0; 1], equipped with the natural order relation , is a complete chain. It is clear that F is an increasing correspondence with no …xed points. At the same time, F is not Veinott-increasing. For example,
), and
The next result is straightforward, but helpful.
Lemma 3 Let P and T be posets, and let F : P T be an increasing upward (resp., downward) correspondence with nonempty values. If _F (p) 2 F (p) (resp., F (p) 2 F (p)) for every p 2 P , then F has an increasing selection.
Proof. In order to show the lemma, it su¢ ces to verify that the function f :
If, for example, the correspondence F is increasing upward and
Directional transfer single crossing
The single-crossing property generalizes the property of increasing di¤erences and has found numerous applications in economics (see, e.g., Edlin and Shannon, 1998; Athey, 2001; Reny and Zamir, 2004; Quan and Strulovici, 2009; and Reny, 2011) . This section contains several generalizations of the single-crossing property.
Let P and T be posets and let f : P T ! R. The function f has increasing di¤erences in (p; t) if for all p
The singlecrossing property is a generalization of the property of increasing di¤erences. The function f satis…es the single-crossing property in (p; t) if for all p 00 p 0 and t
The function f satis…es the weak singlecrossing property in (p; t) if for all p 00 p 0 and t
The single-crossing property is usually used along with the quasisupermodularity property. Let P be a lattice. A function f : P ! R is quasisupemodular if for all p 0 and p
Clearly, every real-valued function de…ned on a totally ordered set is quasisupermodular.
The following lemma is a corollary of Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) .
Lemma 4 Let P be a lattice, T be a poset, and let f : P T ! R be transfer weakly upper continuous in p. Then M : T P de…ned by M (t) = fp 2 P : f (p; t) = max z2P f (z; t)g is Veinott-increasing if f is quasisupermodular in p and satis…es the single-crossing property in (p; t).
Since, in discontinuous games, best-reply correspondences are often not Veinottincreasing, we need to introduce directional transfer single crossing.
De…nition 4 Let P and T be posets and let f : P T ! R. The function f satis…es the upward (resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (p; t) if for all p 0 p 00 (resp., p 0 p 00 ) and t 0 t 00 (resp., t
If, in De…nition 4, b p = p 00 , then the word 'transfer'can be omitted. Obviously, every function f : P T ! R satisfying the upward (resp., downward) singlecrossing property in (p; t) also satis…es the upward (resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (p; t).
The upward and downward single-crossing properties are the two sides of Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) single-crossing property. For the …rst-price sealed-bid auctions with incomplete information, a similar reformulation of Athey's (2001) single-crossing condition can be found in Reny and Zamir (2004) .
Lemma 5 Let P and T be posets and let f : P T ! R. The function f satis…es the single-crossing property in (p; t) if and only if it satis…es the upward and downward single-crossing properties in (p; t).
Proof. Assume that f satis…es the single-crossing property in (p; t). We only need to show that it has the downward single-crossing property in (p; t). Lemma 6 Let P be a totally ordered set and T be a poset, and let f : P T ! R be transfer weakly upper continuous in p. Then M : T P de…ned by M (t) = fp 2 P : f (p; t) = max z2P f (z; t)g is increasing upward (resp., downward) if f satis…es the upward (resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (p; t). 
, a contradiction. A statement, similar to Lemma 6, for correspondences Veinott-increasing upward or downward is the following.
Lemma 7 Let P be a totally ordered set and T be a poset, and let f : P T ! R be transfer weakly upper continuous in p. Then M : T P de…ned by M (t) = fp 2 P : f (p; t) = max z2P f (z; t)g is Veinott-increasing upward (resp., downward) if f satis…es the upward (resp., downward) single-crossing property in (p; t).
It is useful to notice that upward single crossing in Lemma 7 can not be relaxed to Shannon's (1995) weak single crossing.
Example 3 Let P = T = f0; 1g and f (p; t) = maxf1 p; 1 tg for all (p; t) 2 P T . Then the function satis…es the weak single-crossing property in (p; t) trivially because f (1; 0) f (0; 0) = 0: However, M (0) = f1; 0g and M (1) = f0g.
In order to be able to handle games where the best-reply correspondences are not necessarily nonempty-valued everywhere, we now introduce approximate transfer single crossing.
De…nition 5 Let P and T be posets, and let f : P T ! R: The function f satis…es the upward (resp. downward) transfer "-single-crossing property in (p; t) (" > 0) if for all p 0 p 00 (resp., p 0 p 00 ) and t 0 t 00 (resp., t
(resp., b p p 00 ). The function f satis…es the approximate upward (resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (p; t) if it satis…es the upward (resp., downward) transfer "-single-crossing property in (p; t) for every " > 0.
In De…nition 5, the word 'transfer'can be omitted if b p = p 00 . Another possible name for the approximate upward (resp., downward) single-crossing property is 'upward (resp., downward) nondecreasing positive di¤erences.' It can be reformulated as follows: for all p 0 p 00 (resp., p 0 p 00 ) and t 0 t 00 (resp., t
. Approximate single crossing allows us to study strategic complementarities expressed in terms of "-best-reply correspondences.
Lemma 8 Let P be a totally ordered set and T be a poset. If f : P T ! R satis…es the upward (resp., downward) transfer "-single-crossing property in (p; t) for some " > 0, then M " : T P de…ned by M " (t) = fp 2 P : f (p; t) sup z2P f (z; t) "g is increasing downward (resp., upward).
Proof. Let " > 0, and let f satisfy the upward "-single-crossing property in (p; t). Pick some t 0 and t 00 with t 0 t 00 . Pick some p 00 2 M " (t 00 ). We need to show that there exists p 0 2 M " (t 0 ) such that p 0 p 00 . By way of contradiction, assume that it is not the case; that is, p 0 p 00 for every p 0 2 M " (t 0 ). Then p 00 = 2 M " (t 0 ); that is, f (p 00 ; t 0 ) < sup z2P f (z; t 0 ) ". By the de…nition of the least upper bound, there exists z 0 2 M " (t 0 ) such that f (z 0 ; t 0 ) f (p 00 ; t 0 ) > ". Since z 0 p 00 and f satis…es the upward transfer "-single-crossing property in (p; t), we have that f (b p; t 00 ) f (p 00 ; t 00 ) > " for some b p 2 P with b p z 0 , which contradicts the fact that p 00 2 M " (t 00 ). Since increasing upward or downward correspondences need not have an increasing single-valued selection, one more condition is to be added.
Lemma 9 Let P be a totally ordered compact metric space, T be a poset, and " 0. Let f : P T ! R, and let M " : T P de…ned by M " (t) = fp 2 P : f (p; t) sup z2P f (z; t) "g be nonempty-valued. If f is upward (resp., downward) order upper semicontinuous in p, then _M " (t) 2 M " (t) (resp.,^M " (t) 2 M " (t)) for every t 2 T .
It is worth noticing that, in Lemma 9, the condition that the correspondence M " is nonempty-valued matters only when " = 0. The proof of Lemma 9 is provided in the Appendix.
Better-reply security
Although, the notion of a better-reply secure game, due to Reny (1999) , has been generalized in a number of ways recently, we do not need any generalizations of better-reply security for the purposes of the paper. We are interested in the property because, in compact games, it implies that if an "-Nash equilibrium exists for every " > 0, then the game has a Nash equilibrium. It has turned out that studying the existence of "-equilibria in better-reply secure games is quite challenging on its own. For compact, quasiconcave, payo¤ secure games, a solution in this direction was proposed by Prokopovych (2011) .
We now provide some basic facts related to better-reply security, tailored for the needs of the paper.
Consider a compact game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I , where I = f1; : : : ; ng denotes the set of players, each strategy set X i is a nonempty compact metric space with a metric d i , and each payo¤ function u i is a bounded real-valued function de…ned on the Cartesian product X = i2I X i . The set X is a metric space equipped with the product metric d :
for x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) and y = (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ) from X: Denote the set of all pure strategy equilibria of G in X by E G , and
Denote the set of "-Nash equilibria of G by E G (").
Better-reply security can be described as follows: A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I is better-reply secure if and only if whenever x 2 XnE G , there exist " > 0, d = (d 1 ; : : : ; d n ) 2 X, and an open neighborhood U of x in X such that for every y 2 U there is a player i for whom u i (d i ; x 0 i ) > u i (y) + " for every x 0 2 U (see Prokopovych, 2013; and Reny, 2015) .
Lemma 10 Let G = (X i ; u i ) i2I be a compact, better-reply secure game. Let f" k g be a sequence of positive numbers converging to 0, and let x k 2 E G (" k ) for k = 1; 2; : : : : Then every cluster point of the sequence fx k g is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Lemma 10, mentioned in Remark 3.1 of Reny (1999) , easily follows from the above characterization of better-reply security.
Equilibrium existence results
This section begins with Theorem 1, an equilibrium existence result for games where each player's payo¤ function is transfer weakly upper continuous in her own strategy. Then, Theorem 2 provides a set of su¢ cient equilibrium existence conditions for better-reply secure games.
Let I = f1; : : : ; ng. If, for each i 2 I, X i is a partially ordered set with the binary relation i , then X = i2I X i and X i = j2Infig X j are posets with the corresponding product relations; that is, for example, x y in X if x i i y i for each i 2 I. From now on, De…nition 6 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I exhibits strategic complementarities if for each i 2 I: (1) X i is a nonempty totally ordered compact metric space; (2) u i is transfer weakly upper continuous in x i and upward or downward order upper semicontinuous in x i ; (3) u i satis…es the upward (or, resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ).
Condition (1) and Lemma 1 imply that each X i is a complete chain. Each payo¤ function u i can either be upward order upper semicontinuous in x i and satisfy the upward transfer single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ), or be downward order upper semicontinuous in x i and satisfy the downward transfer single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ).
Theorem 1 Every game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I with strategic complementarities has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For each i 2 I, the transfer weakly upper continuity of each u i in x i implies that player i's best-reply correspondence M i :
)g is nonempty-valued. Lemma 6 implies that each M i is increasing upward or downward. Since each u i is upward (or, resp., downward) order upper semicontinuous in x i , it follows from Lemma 9 that, for
. Then, by Lemma 3, each M i has an increasing selection m i . De…ne an increasing function m from X to X by m(x) = (m 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; m n (x n )) for x 2 X. The set X, as the direct product of complete chains, is a complete lattice. Then, by Tarski's …xed point theorem, the function m has a …xed point. This strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium of G.
If the payo¤ functions of a game are not transfer upper weakly continuous in own strategies, we need to use modi…cations of the single-crossing property designed for "-best-reply correspondences, such as the above-introduced approximate upward and downward transfer single-crossing properties.
De…nition 7 A game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I exhibits approximate strategic complementarities if for each i 2 I: (1) X i is a nonempty totally ordered compact metric space; (2) u i is bounded and upward or downward order upper semicontinuous; (3) u i satis…es the approximate upward (or, resp., downward) transfer single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ), and, in addition, G is better-reply secure.
In particular, (1) and (2) imply that G is a compact game (see Reny, 1999) .
Theorem 2 Every game G = (X i ; u i ) i2I with approximate strategic complementarities has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of the theorem consists of two steps. First, we need to show that G has "-Nash equilibria for every " > 0, and then make use of Lemma 10, since the game is compact and better-reply secure.
Fix some " > 0. It follows from Lemma 8 that each "-best-reply correspondence M " i from X i to X i is increasing downward or upward, depending on whether u i satis…es the upward transfer "-single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ) or the downward transfer "-single-crossing property in (x i ; x i ). Since u i is either downward or, respectively, upward order upper semicontinuous in x i , Lemmas 3 and 9 imply that each M " i has an increasing selection m n (x n )) for x 2 X is increasing. By Tarski's …xed point theorem, it has a …xed point. Therefore, G has an "-Nash equilibrium for every " > 0. By Lemma 10, G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Applications
This section explains, with the aid of economics-related examples, the major contributions of the above theorems.
The partnership game studied in Example 4 illustrates the strengths of the generalized upper semicontinuity and single-crossing conditions used in Theorem 1. In the game, the players'payo¤ functions are not upper semicontinuous in their own strategies and their best-reply correspondences are neither Veinott-increasing upward nor Veinott-increasing downward.
Theorem 1 becomes applicable to the war of attrition game studied in Example 5 if the natural order relation on player 2's strategy set is reversed. Then, player 1's payo¤ function satis…es the upward single-crossing property in (x 1 ; x 2 ), and player 2's payo¤ function satis…es the downward single-crossing property in (x 2 ; x 1 ). Consequently, player 1's best-reply correspondence is Veinott-increasing upward, and player 2's is Veinott-increasing downward.
Example 6 is a Bertrand duopoly model with homogeneous products. Reny's (1999) equilibrium existence theorem can not be applied to the game because it is not quasiconcave, and Vives's (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) results can not be applied to it because the payo¤ functions are too discontinuous. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in Example 5 follows from Theorem 2, where the two mentioned approaches are integrated.
Example 4 Each of two partners has no more than one unit of e¤ort to contribute to a project. If each partner i chooses the amount of e¤ort e i 2 [0; 1]; the total output is f (e 1 ; e 2 ) = e 1 + e 2 . Given a pro…le (e 1 ; e 2 ), partner i obtains the fraction p i (e i ; e i ) of the total output, where p i (e i ; e i ) = Assuming that the players'strategy sets are equipped with the natural order, let us, for example, look in some detail at the properties of the correspondence M i . It is neither Veinott-increasing upward (f
)). However, M i is increasing upward since f1g 2 M i (e i ) for every e i 2 [0; 1]. One can also verify that each u i satis…es the upward transfer single crossing property in (e i ; e i ), but not the upward single crossing property (u i ( ). Since, in e i , each u i is transfer weakly upper semicontinuous and upward order upper semicontinuous, it follows from Theorem 1 that the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Example 5 Consider the following war of attrition game G. The players compete for an object over the time interval [0; c]. The players'valuations of the object are equal to v 1 and v 2 , where 0 < v 2 v 1 < c. Player i's set of strategies T i is the set of possible concession times, [0; c]. Player i's payo¤ function is as follows:
T i is given by:
Clearly, each M i is neither increasing upward nor increasing downward. Consider the game G where the payo¤ functions are the same as those in G, but the order on player 2's strategy set is reversed. Thus, in G , t It is not di¢ cult to see that, in G , u 1 is upward order upper semicontinuous in t 1 and satis…es the upward single-crossing property in (t 1 ; t 2 ). To check the latter, pick some t 2 ) u 1 (t 00 1 ; t 0 2 ); that is, the upward single-crossing property in (t 1 ; t 2 ) holds in this case as well. Similarly, u 2 is downward order upper semicontinuous in t 2 and satis…es the downward single-crossing property in (t 2 ; t 1 ).
It is useful to notice that, in G , player 1's best-reply correspondence is Veinottincreasing upward and player 2's best-reply correspondence is Veinott-increasing downward, and the payo¤ functions are transfer weakly upper semicontinuous and upwards order upper semicontinuous in own strategies. Thus, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game G follows from Theorem 1.
In the next example, we use Theorem 2 to show that a nonquasiconcave Bertrand duopoly model with a nonlinear aggregate demand curve has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Its graph is not a straight line, but has a conventional convex shape. Then, …rm i's pro…t function u i : [0; +1) [0; +1) ! R is given by
where i is the other …rm. There is no loss of generality in assuming that each player i's strategy set is X i = [1; 20] because, for each player i, every strategy from the set [0; 1) [(20; +1) is weakly dominated by, for example, p i = 2. Consequently, if the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium on [1; 20] [1; 20], then the strategy pro…le is also a Nash equilibrium of the entire game.
It is useful to notice that the maximizer of the function and 10:5, the game is not quasiconcave.
Verifying whether the "-best-reply correspondences are increasing downward is reduced, in virtue of Lemma 8, to verifying whether each player i's payo¤ function satis…es the approximate upward transfer single-crossing property in (p i ; p i ). We now show this fact for player 1's payo¤ function.
Fix some " > 0. Consider some p It is not di¢ cult to see that each player's payo¤ function is downward order upper semicontinuous in her own strategy. Since the game is better-reply secure, it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Conclusions
Lattice-theoretic tools can be used to study equilibrium existence in strategic games with totally ordered strategy sets where the payo¤ functions are not upper semicontinuous in own strategies and do not satisfy the single-crossing property. If the payo¤ functions are transfer weakly upper continuous in own strategies, the existence of a Nash equilibrium may follow from directional upper semicontinuity and directional transfer single crossing. In games where best-reply correspondences are not necessarily nonempty-valued everywhere, strategic complementarities may reveal themselves in the "-best-reply correspondences. If so, directional approximate transfer single crossing can be employed, along with better-reply security and directional upper semicontinuity. The major results of the paper are illustrated with the aid of a number of economics-related examples to which the seminal contributions by Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , and Reny (1999) are not applicable.
